

<p>429^a10¹</p> <p>15</p> <p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>30</p> <p>429^b1</p> <p>5</p> <p>10</p>	<p>4. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τίς ἔχει διαφοράν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν. εἰ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὡςπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἶδους, καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὡςπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά. ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὡςπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῆ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντιφράττει· ὥστε μὴδ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν. ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχὴ) οὐθὲν ἐστὶν ἐνεργεῖα τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν· διὸ οὐδὲ μεμιχῆται εὐλόγον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποιός τις γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἢ ψυχρός ἢ θερμός· ἢ καὶ ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὡςπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δ' οὐθὲν ἐστὶν. καὶ εἴ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἢ νοητικὴ, οὔτε ἐντελεχεία ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἶδη· ὅτι δ' οὐχ ὁμοία ἢ ἀπάθεια τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητικοῦ, φανερόν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἢ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθησις οὐ δύναται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων, οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὁσμῶν οὔτε ὄραν οὔτε ὁσμάσθαι· ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἤττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός, ὅταν δ' οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ὁ ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατ' ἐνεργειαν (τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν δύνῃται ἐνεργεῖν δι' αὐτοῦ), ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὐρεῖν· καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὐτὸν τότε δύναται νοεῖν.</p> <p>ἐπεὶ δ' ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ὕδατι εἶναι (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων πολλῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ ταυτὸν ἐστὶ), τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι καὶ σάρκα ἢ ἄλλω ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει· ἢ γὰρ σὰρξ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' ὡςπερ τὸ σιμόν, τότε ἐν τῷδε. τῷ</p>	<p>4. Što se tiče dijela duše kojim duša spoznaje i shvaća, bilo da je on odvojiv bilo da nije odvojiv prostorno nego <samo> pojmovno, valja razmotriti koje on razlikovno svojstvo ima i kako uopće nastaje mišljenje. Ako je mišljenje poput osjetilnog zamjećivanja, ono će jamačno biti ili nekakvo trpljenje uzrokovano mislivim predmetom ili nešto drugo tome slično. Zato intelekt mora biti netrpan ali prijemljiv za forme i potencijalno <i>takav</i> ali ne <i>to</i>, te se mora odnositi prema mislivim predmetima baš kao osjetilna sposobnost prema osjetilno zamjetljivim predmetima. Prema tome, budući da misli sve stvari, intelekt mora biti nepomiješan – kao što tvrdi Anaksagora – kako bi vladao, a to znači kako bi spoznao, jer ga priječi i odvrća ako se uzgred pojavi nešto strano. Stoga intelekt nema nikakve druge naravi osim te da je potencijalan. Prema tome, takozvani intelekt duše (a pod intelektom mislim na ono čime duša razmišlja i pretpostavlja) nije u aktualnosti nijedno od bića prije nego što misli. Zato ne bi bilo razložno da je pomiješan s tijelom, jer bi onda imao neku kvalitetu, <primjerice, bio bi> ili hladan ili topao, ili bi postojao neki organ za nj, kao što postoji za osjetilnu sposobnost; no činjenica je da on nije nijedno <od bića prije nego što misli>. Dakle, dobro kažu oni koji vele da je duša mjesto formi, osim što to nije cijela duša nego samo ona misaona i nisu to forme u aktualnosti nego u potencijalnosti. A da netrpnost osjetilne i misaone sposobnosti nije istovrsna, očito je na primjeru osjetilnih organa i osjetila. Osjetilo ne može pružiti osjetilnu zamjedbnu nakon silovitih osjetilno zamjetljivih predmeta, primjerice <sluh ne može pružiti> osjetilnu zamjedbnu zvuka nakon velike buke, niti se može što vidjeti ili omirisati nakon snažnih boja odnosno mirisa. Međutim, kada intelekt misli neki silno mislivi predmet, mišljenje podređenih stvari nije slabije, nego još i bolje. Tome je tako jer osjetilne sposobnosti nema bez tijela, dok je intelekt odvojiv. A kad intelekt postane svaki pojedini mislivi predmet onako kao kad se za znalca kaže da je to u aktualnosti (a to je posrijedi kad god netko može biti aktivan sam od sebe), intelekt je čak i tada na neki način u potencijalnosti, iako ne na isti način kao i prije negoli je naučio ili otkrio; i tada je on sposoban misliti sam sebe.</p> <p>Budući da je veličina jedno a bit veličine drugo, kao i voda i bit vode (a tako je i u mnogo drugih slučajeva, ali ne u svima, jer u nekim slučajevima je to isto), bit mesa i meso razabire se ili različitim sposobnostima ili istom sposobnošću koja je različito disponirana. Naime, mesa nema bez materije, već je ono poput nečega prčastog, <i>ovo-u-ovome</i>. Dakle, osjetilnom sposobnošću</p>	<p>4. Concerning the part of the soul by which the soul knows and figures things out, whether it is separable or not separable in magnitude but only in account, it is necessary to consider what its differentia is and how thinking ever comes about. To be sure, if thinking is like perceiving, it would consist in being somehow affected by the object of thought or in something else of this sort. It must, therefore, be impassive yet capable of receiving the form, potentially suchlike but not this, and just as the perceptual faculty is related to the objects of perception, so the intellect must be related to the objects of thought. It is necessary, then, since it thinks all things, that it be unmixed, just as Anaxagoras says, so that it may rule, i.e. so that it may know; for anything alien appearing along with it would hinder and obstruct it. Consequently, it has no nature other than this: that it is potential. Hence, the so-called intellect of the soul (and by “intellect” I mean that by which the soul thinks and supposes) is in actuality none of the beings before it thinks; nor is it, accordingly, reasonable for it to be mixed with the body, since then it would come to be qualified in a certain way, either cold or hot, or there would be an organ for it, just as there is for the perceptual faculty. As things are, though, it is none <of the beings before it thinks>.³ Therefore, they speak well, further, who say that the soul is a place of forms – except that it is neither the whole soul, but rather the rational soul, nor the forms in actuality, but rather in potentiality. That the impassivity of the perceptual and the thinking faculty is not the same is evident in the case of the sense organs and the senses. For a sense cannot perceive after an intense object of perception, for instance to perceive a sound after huge noise, nor can it see or smell after very powerful colours or odours. By contrast, whenever intellect has thought some intense object of thought, it thinks inferior things not to a lesser degree but rather to a greater. For the perceptual faculty is not without the body, whereas intellect is separable. Whenever it comes to be each thing in the way in which one is said to be a knower in actuality (this occurs whenever one is able to engage in activity by oneself), even then it is somehow in potentiality, not, however, in the same way as before learning or discovering; and then it is able to think itself.</p> <p>Since magnitude is different from the being of magnitude and water from the being of water (and thus also in many other cases, though not in all, for in some they are the same), one discerns flesh and the being of flesh either by means of different things or by means of some one thing differently disposed. For flesh is not without matter, but is rather like the snub, a this in a this. So, it is by the perceptual faculty that one discerns the hot and the cold, and those things of which flesh is a certain</p>
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¹ The Grek text is Förster's, with few departures marked in red type.

³ Other translators: “As things are, it has none <i.e. it has no organ>.”

15	<p>μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικῶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν κρίνει, καὶ ὦν λόγος τις ἢ σάρξ· ἄλλω δέ, ἤτοι χωριστῶ ἢ ὡς ἡ κεκλασμένη ἔχει πρὸς αὐτὴν ὅταν ἐκταθῆ, τὸ σαρκί εἶναι κρίνει. πάλιν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντων τὸ εὐθὺ ὡς τὸ σιμόν· μετὰ συνεχοῦς γάρ· τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι, εἰ ἔστιν ἕτερον</p>	<p>razabire se toplo i hladno te svojstva čiji određeni omjer čini meso, dok se drugom sposobnošću – bila ona nešto odvojivo ili poput izlomljene crte u odnosu na samu sebe kad se ispravi – razabire se bit mesa. K tome, u slučaju apstraktnih bića, ono ravno je poput onog prácastog, jer je združeno s kontinuitetom, dok je bit nešto različito, ako već bit ravnog nije isto što i ono ravno; uzmimo da je to nekakvo dvojtvo. Prema tome, te stvari razabiru se ili različitim sposobnostima ili istom sposobnošću koja je različito disponirana. Oprćenito, dakle, onako kako su stvari odvojive od materije, tako je i u vezi s intelektom.</p>	<p>proportion, whereas it is by something else, be it separable or as a bent line related to itself when straightened out, that one discerns the being of flesh. Further, in the case of things which are by abstraction, the straight is as the snub is, since it is with extension. The essence, though, if it is the case that the being of straight and the straight differ, is something else. For let it be duality: then one discerns it either by different things or by something differently disposed. Generally, then, as things are separable from matter, so it is also with respect to intellect.</p>
20	<p>τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὐθύ, ἄλλω· ἔστω γὰρ δυάς· ἐτέρω ἄρα ἢ ἐτέρως ἔχοντι κρίνει. ὅλως ἄρα ὡς χωριστὰ τὰ πράγματα τῆς ὕλης, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν νοῦν.</p>	<p>Netko bi mogao iznijeti problem: ako je intelekt jednostavan i netpan i s ničim nema ništa zajedničko, kao što veli Anaksagora, kako će on uopće misliti, ako se mišljenje sastoji u nekakvom trpljenju? Ili je ipak nešto zajedničko prisutno u oboje, tako da jedno tvori a drugo trpi. K tome, je li on i sam misliv? Naime, ili će intelekt pripadati ostalim stvarima (ako nije sâm misliv po čemu drugome, a svi mislivi predmeti su iste vrste), ili će imati nešto primiješano što ga čini mislivim baš poput ostalih stvari. Ili je ipak posrijedi trpljenje koje uključuje nešto zajedničko, kao što smo već ranije odredili: da intelekt na neki način u potenciji jest mislivi predmeti, dok u aktualnosti nije ništa prije negoli misli. Moralo bi to biti kao u slučaju papira na kojemu nema ničega u aktualnosti zapisanoga; i upravo je tako s intelektom. I on je sâm misliv baš kao i mislivi predmeti. U slučaju predmeta bez materije isto je ono što misli i ono što je mišljeno, jer znanstveno znanje i ono što je na taj način znatljivo jest isto (no valjalo bi razmotriti uzrok toga zašto onda ne misli uvijek). U predmetima pak koji imaju materiju, intelekt je samo potencijalno svaki pojedini mislivi predmet. Stoga intelekt neće pripadati njima (jer je intelekt usmjeren na takve stvari nematerijalna potencija), dok će njemu pripadati to da je misliv.</p>	<p>Someone might raise a difficulty: if intellect is simple and impassive and has nothing in common with anything, just as Anaxagoras says, how will it think, if thinking consists in being affected somehow? For, insofar as something common belongs to both, that one thing seems to act and the other to be affected. And there is a further difficulty: is intellect itself an object of thought? For either it will belong to other things, if it is an object of thought itself not in virtue of something else, and the object of thought is one in species, or it will have something mixed with it which makes it an object of thought just as other things are. Now, the point that being affected occurs in virtue of something common has already been addressed earlier, when we said that intellect is its objects in a certain way in potentiality, though it is nothing in actuality before it thinks. It should be like a writing tablet on which nothing written in actuality is present, which is just what turns out in the case of intellect. And it is itself thinkable just as objects of thought are. For, in the case of things without matter, what thinks and what is thought are the same, since theoretical knowledge and what is known in this way are the same (the cause, however, of not always thinking should be investigated). In the case of things which have matter, by contrast, it is only potentially each object of thought.⁴ Consequently, intellect will not belong to those things (for, intellect concerned with these sorts of things is a potentiality without matter), though it will belong to intellect to be an object of thought.</p>
25	<p>ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθεὶ μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστιν; ἢ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἔτι δ' εἰ νοητὸς καὶ αὐτὸς· ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἄλλο αὐτὸς νοητὸς, ἐν δὲ τί τὸ νοητὸν εἶδει, ἢ μεμιγμένον τι ἔξει, ὃ ποιεῖ νοητὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τᾶλλα. ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ</p>	<p>Netko bi mogao iznijeti problem: ako je intelekt jednostavan i netpan i s ničim nema ništa zajedničko, kao što veli Anaksagora, kako će on uopće misliti, ako se mišljenje sastoji u nekakvom trpljenju? Ili je ipak nešto zajedničko prisutno u oboje, tako da jedno tvori a drugo trpi. K tome, je li on i sam misliv? Naime, ili će intelekt pripadati ostalim stvarima (ako nije sâm misliv po čemu drugome, a svi mislivi predmeti su iste vrste), ili će imati nešto primiješano što ga čini mislivim baš poput ostalih stvari. Ili je ipak posrijedi trpljenje koje uključuje nešto zajedničko, kao što smo već ranije odredili: da intelekt na neki način u potenciji jest mislivi predmeti, dok u aktualnosti nije ništa prije negoli misli. Moralo bi to biti kao u slučaju papira na kojemu nema ničega u aktualnosti zapisanoga; i upravo je tako s intelektom. I on je sâm misliv baš kao i mislivi predmeti. U slučaju predmeta bez materije isto je ono što misli i ono što je mišljeno, jer znanstveno znanje i ono što je na taj način znatljivo jest isto (no valjalo bi razmotriti uzrok toga zašto onda ne misli uvijek). U predmetima pak koji imaju materiju, intelekt je samo potencijalno svaki pojedini mislivi predmet. Stoga intelekt neće pripadati njima (jer je intelekt usmjeren na takve stvari nematerijalna potencija), dok će njemu pripadati to da je misliv.</p>	<p>Someone might raise a difficulty: if intellect is simple and impassive and has nothing in common with anything, just as Anaxagoras says, how will it think, if thinking consists in being affected somehow? For, insofar as something common belongs to both, that one thing seems to act and the other to be affected. And there is a further difficulty: is intellect itself an object of thought? For either it will belong to other things, if it is an object of thought itself not in virtue of something else, and the object of thought is one in species, or it will have something mixed with it which makes it an object of thought just as other things are. Now, the point that being affected occurs in virtue of something common has already been addressed earlier, when we said that intellect is its objects in a certain way in potentiality, though it is nothing in actuality before it thinks. It should be like a writing tablet on which nothing written in actuality is present, which is just what turns out in the case of intellect. And it is itself thinkable just as objects of thought are. For, in the case of things without matter, what thinks and what is thought are the same, since theoretical knowledge and what is known in this way are the same (the cause, however, of not always thinking should be investigated). In the case of things which have matter, by contrast, it is only potentially each object of thought.⁴ Consequently, intellect will not belong to those things (for, intellect concerned with these sorts of things is a potentiality without matter), though it will belong to intellect to be an object of thought.</p>
30	<p>κοινόν τι διήρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πῶς ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχεία οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῆ. δεῖ δ' οὕτως ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχεία γεγραμμένον· ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητὸς ἐστὶ ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἢ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἢ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν (τοῦ δὲ μὴ αἰεὶ νοεῖν τὸ αἰτιον ἐπισκεπτέον). ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστον ἐστὶ τῶν νοητῶν. ὥστ' ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρξει νοῦς (ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ νοῦς τῶν τοιούτων), ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὑπάρξει.</p>	<p>Netko bi mogao iznijeti problem: ako je intelekt jednostavan i netpan i s ničim nema ništa zajedničko, kao što veli Anaksagora, kako će on uopće misliti, ako se mišljenje sastoji u nekakvom trpljenju? Ili je ipak nešto zajedničko prisutno u oboje, tako da jedno tvori a drugo trpi. K tome, je li on i sam misliv? Naime, ili će intelekt pripadati ostalim stvarima (ako nije sâm misliv po čemu drugome, a svi mislivi predmeti su iste vrste), ili će imati nešto primiješano što ga čini mislivim baš poput ostalih stvari. Ili je ipak posrijedi trpljenje koje uključuje nešto zajedničko, kao što smo već ranije odredili: da intelekt na neki način u potenciji jest mislivi predmeti, dok u aktualnosti nije ništa prije negoli misli. Moralo bi to biti kao u slučaju papira na kojemu nema ničega u aktualnosti zapisanoga; i upravo je tako s intelektom. I on je sâm misliv baš kao i mislivi predmeti. U slučaju predmeta bez materije isto je ono što misli i ono što je mišljeno, jer znanstveno znanje i ono što je na taj način znatljivo jest isto (no valjalo bi razmotriti uzrok toga zašto onda ne misli uvijek). U predmetima pak koji imaju materiju, intelekt je samo potencijalno svaki pojedini mislivi predmet. Stoga intelekt neće pripadati njima (jer je intelekt usmjeren na takve stvari nematerijalna potencija), dok će njemu pripadati to da je misliv.</p>	<p>Someone might raise a difficulty: if intellect is simple and impassive and has nothing in common with anything, just as Anaxagoras says, how will it think, if thinking consists in being affected somehow? For, insofar as something common belongs to both, that one thing seems to act and the other to be affected. And there is a further difficulty: is intellect itself an object of thought? For either it will belong to other things, if it is an object of thought itself not in virtue of something else, and the object of thought is one in species, or it will have something mixed with it which makes it an object of thought just as other things are. Now, the point that being affected occurs in virtue of something common has already been addressed earlier, when we said that intellect is its objects in a certain way in potentiality, though it is nothing in actuality before it thinks. It should be like a writing tablet on which nothing written in actuality is present, which is just what turns out in the case of intellect. And it is itself thinkable just as objects of thought are. For, in the case of things without matter, what thinks and what is thought are the same, since theoretical knowledge and what is known in this way are the same (the cause, however, of not always thinking should be investigated). In the case of things which have matter, by contrast, it is only potentially each object of thought.⁴ Consequently, intellect will not belong to those things (for, intellect concerned with these sorts of things is a potentiality without matter), though it will belong to intellect to be an object of thought.</p>
430*1	<p>5. Ἐπεὶ δ' [ὥσπερ] ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἐκάστω γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκείνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἢ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργεῖα χρώματα. καὶ οὕτως ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὦν ἐνεργεῖα· αἰεὶ γὰρ τιμώτε-</p>	<p>5. Kao što u svekolikoj prirodi za svaku vrstu postoji materija (to je ono što je u potenciji svaka od tih stvari), dok je nešto drugo uzrok i ono tvorbeno, utoliko što sve tvori, poput umijeća u odnosu na odgovarajuću materiju, nužno je pretpostaviti da isto razlikovanje postoji i u duši; pa je jedan intelekt takav <poput materije> utoliko što uz pomoć njega sve nastaje, dok je drugi <poput uzroka i onog tvorbenog> utoliko što sve tvori, kao nekakvo postignuto stanje, poput svjetlosti; naime, na neki način svjetlost od boja u potenciji tvori boje u aktualnosti. I taj je intelekt odvojiv i netpan i nepomiještan, budući da je po svojoj supstanciji aktualnost. Naime, uvijek je vrjednije ono što tvori od onoga što</p>	<p>5. Since in all of nature there is something which is the matter for each kind of thing (and this is what is all those things in potentiality), while something else is the cause and producer, on account of producing them all, as craft is related to its matter, it is necessary that these differences be present also in the soul. And one intellect is such <viz. like matter> on account of coming to be all things, while another <is like the cause and producer> on account of producing them all, as a kind of positive state, like light; for in a certain way, light makes colours which are in potentiality colours in actuality. And this intellect is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its essence an activity. For what acts is always superior to what is affected and the principle to the matter.</p>
15	<p>5. Ἐπεὶ δ' [ὥσπερ] ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἐκάστω γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκείνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἢ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργεῖα χρώματα. καὶ οὕτως ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὦν ἐνεργεῖα· αἰεὶ γὰρ τιμώτε-</p>	<p>5. Kao što u svekolikoj prirodi za svaku vrstu postoji materija (to je ono što je u potenciji svaka od tih stvari), dok je nešto drugo uzrok i ono tvorbeno, utoliko što sve tvori, poput umijeća u odnosu na odgovarajuću materiju, nužno je pretpostaviti da isto razlikovanje postoji i u duši; pa je jedan intelekt takav <poput materije> utoliko što uz pomoć njega sve nastaje, dok je drugi <poput uzroka i onog tvorbenog> utoliko što sve tvori, kao nekakvo postignuto stanje, poput svjetlosti; naime, na neki način svjetlost od boja u potenciji tvori boje u aktualnosti. I taj je intelekt odvojiv i netpan i nepomiještan, budući da je po svojoj supstanciji aktualnost. Naime, uvijek je vrjednije ono što tvori od onoga što</p>	<p>5. Since in all of nature there is something which is the matter for each kind of thing (and this is what is all those things in potentiality), while something else is the cause and producer, on account of producing them all, as craft is related to its matter, it is necessary that these differences be present also in the soul. And one intellect is such <viz. like matter> on account of coming to be all things, while another <is like the cause and producer> on account of producing them all, as a kind of positive state, like light; for in a certain way, light makes colours which are in potentiality colours in actuality. And this intellect is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its essence an activity. For what acts is always superior to what is affected and the principle to the matter.</p>

⁴ Thus Shields and Miller. Hicks, Hamlyn, Corcilius and Reeve translate this sentence to the effect that in things which have matter each object of thought is potentially present.

<p>20 25</p>	<p>ρον τὸ ποιῶν τῷ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἢ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνον προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνον· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδῖον. οὐ μνημονεύομεν δὲ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.</p>	<p>trpi, odnosno princip od materije. A aktualno znanstveno znanje istovjetno je sa svojim predmetom, dok potencijalno znanstveno znanje vremenski prethodi u pojedinačnoj stvari, ali općenito gledajući čak ni vremenski ne prethodi; naprotiv, <tvorbeni intelekt> nije takav da nekad misli, a nekad ne misli. I kad je odvojen, jedino je on upravo ono što zapravo jest, i jedino je on besmrtn i vječan. No mi se toga ne sjećamo jer je on netran, dok je trpni um propadljiv, a bez njega ništa ne misli.</p>	<p>Knowledge in actuality is the same as the thing, though in an individual knowledge in potentiality is prior in time, though generally it is not prior even in time; on the contrary, it is not the case that sometimes it thinks and sometimes it does not think. And having been separated, it is only what it essentially is, and this alone is immortal and everlasting, though we do not remember, because this is impassive, whereas passive intellect is perishable, and without it nothing thinks.</p>
<p>30 430^{b1} 5 10 15 20</p>	<p>6. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαίρετων νόησις ἐν τούτοις· περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος. ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές συνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἐν ὄντων, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔφη “ἢ πολλῶν μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν”, ἔπειτα συντίθεσθαι τῇ φιλίᾳ, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα συντίθεται, οἷον τὸ ἀσύμμετρον καὶ ἡ διάμετρος· ἂν δὲ γενομένων ἢ ἐσομένων, τὸν χρόνον προσεννοῶν καὶ συντίθησι. τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει αἰεὶ· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ λευκὸν μὴ λευκὸν, τὸ μὴ λευκὸν συνέθηκεν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν φάναι πάντα. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔστι γε οὐ μόνον τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ ἀληθές, ὅτι λευκὸς Κλέων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἦν ἢ ἔσται. τὸ δὲ ἐν ποιῶν, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς ἕκαστον. τὸ δ' ἀδιαίρετον ἐπεὶ διχῶς, ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐθὲν κωλύει νοεῖν τὸ ἀδιαίρετον ὅταν νοῖ τὸ μήκος (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ), καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἀδιαίρετῳ· ὁμοίως γὰρ ὁ χρόνος διαίρετός καὶ ἀδιαίρετος τῷ μήκει. οὐκ οὖν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει τί ἐνόει ἕκατέρῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἂν μὴ διαίρεθῇ, ἀλλ' ἢ δυνάμει. χωρὶς δ' ἕκατέρου νοῶν τῶν ἡμίσεων διαίρεται καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἅμα· τότε δ' οἰονεὶ μήκη. εἰ δ' ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶδει νοεῖ ἐν ἀδιαίρετῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀδιαίρετῳ τῆς ψυχῆς· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ἐκεῖνα, διαίρετὰ ᾗ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾗ χρόνῳ. {ἀλλ' ἢ ἀδιαίρετα}· ἔνεστι γὰρ κἂν τούτοις τι ἀδιαίρετον, ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐ χωριστόν, ὃ ποιεῖ ἕνα τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸ μήκος· καὶ τοῦθ' ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπαντί ἐστι τῷ συνεχεῖ, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ μήκει. ἢ δὲ στιγματῆ καὶ πᾶσα διαίρεσις, καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἀδιαίρετον, δηλοῦται ὥσπερ ἡ στέρησις. καὶ ὁμοίως ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον πῶς τὸ κακὸν γνωρίζει ἢ τὸ μέλαν· τῷ ἐναντίῳ γὰρ πῶς γνωρίζει· δεῖ δὲ δυνάμει εἶναι τὸ γνωρίζον καὶ ἐνεῖναι² ἐν αὐτῷ. εἰ δὲ τι μὴ ἔστιν</p>	<p>6. Mišljenje nedjeljivih stvari spada u slučajeve u kojima nema neistinitosti. Slučajevi u kojima ima i neistinitosti i istinitosti uključuju nekakvo sastavljanje misli kao da su jedno – baš kao što Empedoklo reče “gdje mnogih izniknu glave bez vratova”, nakon čega ih je Ljubav sastavila – tako se i te stvari, iako su <međusobno> odvojene, sastavljaju, primjerice asimetričnost i dijagonala. Misle li se stvari koje su bile ili koje će biti, pridodaje se misao o vremenu i sastavlja <ga se s mišlju o stvari>. Naime, neistinitost je uvijek u sastavljanju, jer čak i ako se pomisli da nešto bijelo jest nebijelo, nebijelo je dodano sastavljanjem. A svi takvi slučajevi mogu se nazvati i razdvajanjem. Kako bilo, nije neistinito ili istinito samo da je Kleon bijel, nego i da je bio ili da će biti <bijel>. A ono što u svakom pojedinom slučaju tvori jedinstvo jest intelekt. Budući da se “nedjeljivo” rabi u dva smisla, ili u potenciji ili u aktualnosti, ništa ne priječi da <netko> misli nešto nedjeljivo kad god misli neku veličinu (jer je veličina nedjeljiva u aktualnosti) i da to čini u nedjeljivom vremenu. Naime, vrijeme je djeljivo ili nedjeljivo na isti način kao i veličina. Prema tome, nije moguće odrediti što netko misli u svakoj od dviju polovina vremena; to nije moguće, naime, ako predmet nije <u aktualnosti> podijeljen nego samo u potencijalnosti. Ako pak odvojeno misli svaku polovinu <predmeta>, umah dijeli i vrijeme; no ono je tada poput <više> veličina. A ako <predmet> misli kao sastavljen od obje polovine, misli ih i u vremenu za obje. Ono pak što je nedjeljivo, ali ne s obzirom na količinu nego po formi, <netko> misli u nedjeljivom vremenu i nedjeljivim dijelom duše; a taj dio kojim misli i to vrijeme u kojemu misli djeljivi su <samo> akcidentalno, dakle ne onako kako su oni <ranije spomenuti predmeti djeljivi>, nego onako kako su ovi nedjeljivi. Naime, postoji i u njima <dijelu duše i vremenu mišljenja> nešto nedjeljivo, iako zacijelo ne i odvojivo, što vrijeme i veličinu tvori jednim. I to je tako sa svakim kontinuumom, kako s vremenom tako i s veličinom. S druge strane, <geometrijska> točka, svako sjecište i sve ono na taj način nedjeljivo, očituje se na isti način kao i lišenost. Isto je objašnjenje i za ostale slučajeve, na primjer</p>	<p>6. Thinking of <i>adiareta</i> is among the things concerning which there is no falsity, but where there is both falsity and truth there is already some combination of thoughts as being one; as Empedocles said, “Where there sprang the neckless heads of many things”, thereafter combined by Love, so too these, having been separated, are combined, for instance the incommensurable and the diagonal. Should thinking be of what has gone before or what will be, one adds the thought of time and combines it <with the rest>. For falsity always involves combination, since even if <one thinks> a white thing to be not white, one has combined the not white <with the white thing>. It is also possible, though, to maintain that all are instances of division. In any case, however, it is surely not only true or false that Cleon is white, but also that he was or will be <white>. What produces a unity in each case is intellect. Since the <i>adiareton</i> is spoken of in two ways, either in potentiality or in actuality, nothing precludes one’s thinking what is <i>adiareton</i> whenever one thinks of a length (for this is <i>adiareton</i> in actuality), and in an <i>adiaretos</i> time, since time is <i>diaretos</i> and <i>adiaretos</i> in a manner similar to a length. Accordingly, it is not possible to say what one was thinking in each half, since as long as the whole has not been divided, there is no half except in potentiality. And if one thinks each of the halves separately, one also divides the time simultaneously, but then it is as it were <several> lengths. And if it is thought of as made up of both halves, it is also thought of in the time corresponding to both halves. Furthermore, what is <i>adiareton</i> not in quantity but in form, one thinks it in an <i>adiaretos</i> time and by an <i>adiareton</i> of the soul; and that by which one thinks and the time in which one thinks are <i>diareta</i> accidentally, not in the way in which those <are <i>diareta</i>>, but in the way in which they are <i>adiareta</i>. For, in them too there is something <i>adiareton</i>, though presumably not separable, which makes the time and the length one; and this is similar for every continuous thing, both time and length. The point and every <geometrical> division, i.e. whatever is <i>adiareton</i> in this way, is revealed just as a privation is. And the account is similar in other cases, for instance how one knows bad or black; for one knows it somehow by its opposite, but that which knows <bad or black> needs to be <bad or black> potentially and be present in it. If some of the causes has nothing</p>

² ἐνεῖναι mss. Förster: ἐν εἶναι LX, lemma in Philoponus, Polansky, Reeve.

25 30	<p>ἐναντίον τῶν αἰτίων, αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ γινώσκει καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐστὶ καὶ χωριστόν. ἔστι δ' ἢ μὲν φάσις τι κατὰ τινος, ὥσπερ ἢ κατάφρασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς πᾶσα· ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀληθὴς, καὶ οὐ τι κατὰ τινος· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ ὄραν τοῦ ἰδίου ἀληθές, εἰ δ' ἀνθρώπος τὸ λευκὸν ἢ μὴ, οὐκ ἀληθές ἀεί, οὕτως ἔχει ὅσα ἄνευ ὕλης.</p>	<p>kako se spoznaje loše ili crno, jer ih se spoznaje nekako pomoću odgovarajuće opreke. A ono što spoznaje mora biti u potenciji <ta opreka> i mora biti prisutno u njoj. Ako pak neki od uzroka nema opreke, on spoznaje sam sebe, aktualnost je i odvojiv je. Tvrdnja predicira nešto o nečemu, baš kao i negacija, i svaka je istinita ili neistinita, dok intelekt nije uvijek <istinit ili neistint>, nego je istinit kad misli ono što neka stvar jest s obzirom na njenu bit i tada nema prediciranja nečega o nečemu. Kao što je vizualno zamjećivanje posebnog predmeta <osjetila vida, tj. boje> istinito, dok nije uvijek istinito je li ono bijelo čovjek ili nije, tako je i s mislivim predmetima bez materije.</p>	<p>opposite to it, then it knows itself, it is an activity and it is separable. Now an assertion is <predicating> one thing of another, as is the case with an affirmation, and it is always true or false. But this is not so with all intellect; rather intellect directed at what something is with regard to its essence is true, and is not <predicating> one thing of another. Rather, just as the seeing of a special <object of perception> is true, while whether the white thing is a man or not is not always true, so it is with whatever is without matter.</p>
431 ^{a1}	<p>7. Τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι. ἢ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνον προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνον· ἔστι γὰρ ἐξ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος πάντα τὰ γινόμενα. φαίνεται δὲ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνεργεῖα ποιῶν· οὐ γὰρ πάσχει οὐδ' ἀλλοιοῦται. διὸ ἄλλο εἶδος τοῦτο κινήσεως· ἢ γὰρ κινήσις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐνέργεια, ἢ δ' ἀπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἐτέρα, ἢ τοῦ τετελεσμένου. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, διώκει ἢ φεύγει· καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἢ φυγῆ δὲ καὶ ἢ ὀρεξίς ταυτὸ ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτικόν, οὐτ' ἀλλήλων οὕτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο. τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει· ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, κατάφρασιν ἢ ἀπόφρασιν καὶ φεύγει ἢ διώκει· διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἢ ψυχῆ. ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ ἀήρ τὴν κόρην τοιανδί ἐποίησεν, αὕτη δ' ἕτερον, καὶ ἢ ἀκοῆ ὡς αὐτῶς, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἕν, καὶ μία μεσότης, τὸ δ' εἶναι αὐτῇ πλειώ. τίτι δ' ἐπικρίνει τί διαφέρει γλυκὺ καὶ θερμόν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, λεκτέον δὲ καὶ ὧδε. ἔστι γὰρ ἕν τι, οὕτω δὲ ὡς ὁ ὄρος· καὶ ταῦτα, ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὄν, ἔχει πρὸς ἐκάτερον· ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἀλληλα· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἀπορεῖν πῶς τὰ μὴ ὁμογενῆ κρίνει ἢ τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν; ἔστω δὴ ὡς τὸ Α τὸ λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ Β τὸ μέλαν, τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Δ [ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἀλληλα]· ὥστε καὶ ἐναλλάξ. εἰ δὴ τὰ ΓΔ ἐνὶ εἰῇ ὑπάρχοντα, οὕτως ἔξει· ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ΑΒ, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν</p>	<p>7. Aktualno znanstveno znanje istovjetno je sa svojim predmetom, dok potencijalno znanstveno znanje vremenski prethodi u pojedinačnoj stvari, ali općenito gledajući čak ni vremenski ne prethodi. Naime, sve što nastaje čini to iz onoga što je u aktualnosti. Očito je da osjetilno zamjetljivi predmet čini da osjetilna sposobnost koja je u potenciji pređe u aktualnost, jer ona pritom ne trpi niti se preinačuje; zato je tu posrijedi druga vrsta kretanja. Naime, kretanje je aktualnost nečega nedovršenoga, dok je aktualnost kao takva nešto drugo – aktualnost nečega dovršenoga. Osjetilno zamjećivanje i mišljenje je poput puke tvrdnje, a kad je to ugodno ili bolno, kao potvrđujući ili nijećući slijedi odnosno izbjegava. Zapravo, osjećati ugodu i bol jest djelovati osjetilnom srednjošću s obzirom na dobro ili loše kao takvo. Također, izbjegavanje i slijedenje/Zelja su u aktualnosti isto te sposobnost da se slijedi i sposobnost da se izbjegava nisu različite sposobnosti, niti u odnosu jedna na drugu niti u odnosu na osjetilnu sposobnost, iako im je bit različita. Razumskoj pak duši predodžbe pripadaju kao osjetilni utisci, pa kad su dobre ili loše, ona potvrđuje ili niječe te izbjegava ili slijedi. Zato duša nikad ne misli bez predodžbe. Kao što zrak očnu tekućinu čini takvom i takvom, a ona to prenosi dalje (a isto tako i sa sluhom), dok je ono posljednje nešto jedno i jedna srednjost, iako joj je bit višestruka. Već je ranije rečeno čime razlučujemo kako se razlikuju slatko i toplo, no valja to kazati i ovako. Naime, postoji nešto jedno, a to je poput granice. Budući da su i osjetilne kvalitete jedno po analogiji i po broju, one se odnose jedna prema drugoj kao i one stvari <odgovarajuće osjetilne sposobnosti> jedna prema drugom. Naime, koja je razlika ako pitamo kako se razlučuju neistovrsne kvalitete ili oprečne kvalitete? Neka se A (bijelo) odnosi prema B (crnom) kao C prema D. Jer ako CD pripadaju nečemu jednom, bit će to baš kao i AB – nešto jedno i isto, ali ne istovjetne biti – pa tako i u onom slučaju. A isto vrijedi i ako bi A bilo slatko, a B bijelo.</p>	<p>7. Actual knowledge is the same as its object. In an individual, however, potential knowledge is prior in time, though in general it is not prior even in time, since it is from something in actuality that all things come to be. It is evident that the object of perception makes the perceptual faculty from being in potentiality to be in actuality; for it is not affected or altered. Consequently, this kind is different from motion, since motion is an actuality of something incomplete, whereas unqualified actuality, that of something complete, is something else. Perception is similar, then, to mere asserting and thinking; however, whenever it is pleasant or painful, it pursues or avoids as if affirming or denying. And to feel pleasure and pain is to be active with the perceptual mean in relation to what is good or bad, insofar as they are such. And avoidance and desire/pursuit in actuality are the same, and the capacity to desire/pursue and the capacity to avoid do not differ either from one another or from the perceptual faculty, though they do differ in being. Images belong to the rational soul like percepts, and whenever they are good or bad, it affirms or negates and pursues or avoids; consequently, the soul never thinks without an image. Just as the air makes the eye-jelly such and such, and this in turn something else, and likewise in the case of hearing, the last thing is one, i.e. a single mean, though its being is multiple. What it is by which one discriminates how the sweet and the hot differ has been said earlier, but it should be spelled out also as follows. There is some one thing, and it is like a boundary; and these too, being one by analogy and in number, stand in relation each to the other as those stand to one another. For what is the difference between puzzling how one discriminates things not of the same kind and how one discriminates opposites, like white and black? Let A, the white, stand in relation to B, the black, as C stands in relation to D; thus the converse will also hold. If, then, CD belong to one thing, then it will be the case, just as for AB, that this thing is one and the same, though its being is not the same, and similarly for those others. And the same argument holds if A is the sweet and B the white.</p>

<p>431^{b1}</p> <p>5</p> <p>10</p> <p>15</p> <p>20</p> <p>25</p> <p>432^{a1}</p> <p>5</p>	<p>καὶ ἐν, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, κάκεινο ὁμοίως, ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν Α τὸ γλυκὺ εἶη, τὸ δὲ Β τὸ λευκόν.</p> <p>τὰ μὲν οὖν εἶδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὄρισται αὐτῶ τὸ διοικτὸν καὶ φευκτὸν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ἦ, κινεῖται. οἷον αἰσθανόμενος τὸν φρυκτὸν, ὅτι πῦρ, τῇ κοινῇ γνωρίζει, ὁρῶν κινούμενον, ὅτι πολέμιος· ὅτε δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν, ὥσπερ ὁρῶν, λογίζεται καὶ βουλευέται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα· καὶ ὅταν εἴτῃ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει, καὶ ὅλως ἐν πράξει. καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως, τὸ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν τῶ αὐτῶ γένει ἐστὶ τῶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ κακῶ· ἀλλὰ τῶ γε ἀπλῶς διαφέρει καὶ τινί. τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα νοεῖ ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ σιμὸν, ἢ μὲν σιμὸν, οὐ κεχωρισμένως, ἢ δὲ κοῖλον, εἴ τις ἐνόει ἐνεργεία, ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει ἐν ἢ τὸ κοῖλον· οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικά οὐ κεχωρισμένα ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ, ὅταν νοῖ ἐκεῖνα. ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κατ' ἐνεργείαν τὰ πράγματα [νοῶν]. ἄρα δ' ἐνδέχεται τῶν κεχωρισμένων τι νοεῖν ὄντα αὐτὸν μὴ κεχωρισμένον μεγέθους, ἢ οὐ, σκεπτέον ὕστερον.</p> <p>8. Νῦν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαντες, εἰπόμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστὶ πάντα· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἢ δ' αἰσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά· πῶς δὲ τοῦτο, δεῖ ζητεῖν. τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἢ μὲν δυνάμει εἰς τὰ δυνάμει, ἢ δ' ἐντελεχεία εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχεία. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταῦτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ αἰσθητὸν. ἀνάγκη δ' ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἶδη εἶναι· αὐτὰ μὲν δι' οὐ· οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος· ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χεὶρ ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις [εἶδος αἰσθητῶν]. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθὲν ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον, ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστὶ, τὰ τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα; καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔξεις καὶ πάθη.</p>	<p>Misaona sposobnost, dakle, forme misli u predodžbama, pa kao što je pojedincu određeno što valja slijediti i izbjegavati u onim slučajevima <koji uključuju osjetilno zamjećivanje, ugodu i bol>, tako i izvan područja osjetilnog zamjećivanja, kad je usmjerana na odgovarajuće predodžbe, dolazi do kretanja. Na primjer, netko zamijeti signal, jer se radi o plamenu, pa uz pomoć zajedničkog <osjetila> shvati, vidjevši da se kreće, da je to znak za uzbuju; a ponekad netko uz pomoć predodžbi ili misli u duši, kao da ih vidi, zaključuje i odvaguje buduće stvari s onima sada prisutnima. I kad utvrdi, kao i u onom slučaju, da je ugodno ili bolno, tako i u ovom slučaju izbjegava ili slijedi, i općenito je tako s djelovanjem. A ono što je izvan područja djelovanja, naime istinito i neistinito, pripada istom rodu kao i dobro i loše, iako se, dakako, razlikuju kad se uzmu naprosto i kad se uzmu ovisno o pojedincu. Apstraktni predmeti misle se kao da se radi onom prčastom: kao prčasto, to nije odvojeno <tj. bez odgovarajuće materije>, ali kao konkavno, ako bi netko to mislio u aktualnosti, mislit će to bez mesa u kojemu se nalazi konkavnost. Tako matematički predmeti nisu odvojeni, kad ih tko misli kao odvojene, kad god ih već misli. Općenito je intelekt u aktualnosti istovjetan s predmetima <koje misli>. Kasnije pak valja razmotriti može li on misliti neku od stvari koje jesu odvojene, s obzirom da on sam nije odvojen od veličine, ili ne može.</p> <p>8. Sažmajuci ono što smo izložili o duši, kažimo sada iznova da duša jenna neki način sva bića. Naime, bića su ili osjetilno zamjetljiva ili misлива, te je znanstveno znanje na neki način istovjetno znanstveno znatljivim bićima, a osjetilnost osjetilno zamjetljivim bićima. Dakle, znanstveno znanje i osjetilnost se dijele prema svojim predmetima, znanstveno znanje i osjetilnost u potenciji prema potencijalnim predmetima, a znanstveno znanje i osjetilnost u aktualnosti prema aktualnim predmetima. Osjetilna i znanstvena sposobnost duše jesu ti predmeti u potencijalnosti, znanstveno znatljivi predmeti odnosno osjetilno zamjetljivi predmet. Te dvije sposobnosti duše moraju biti ili sami ti predmeti ili forme tih predmeta. Zacijelo nisu sami ti predmeti, jer u duši nije kamen, već njegova forma. Stoga je duša poput ruke; naime kao što je ruka oruđe oruđa, tako je intelekt forma formi i osjetilnost forma osjetilno zamjetljivih stvari. Budući da mimo osjetilnih veličina, kako se čini, ne postoji ništa odvojeno, mislivi se predmeti nalaze u osjetilno zamjetljivim formama, kako apstraktni predmeti tako i oni koji su stanja i atributi osjetilno zamjetljivih predmeta. Stoga onaj tko osjetilno ne zamjećuje ne bi mogao ništa niti naučiti niti shvatiti. I kada netko nešto motri <tj.</p>	<p>The thinking faculty thinks some forms in images, and just as what is to be pursued and avoided is determined for one in those cases <viz. in perceptual cases>, so too apart from perception, when it is busy with images, one is moved. For instance, one who perceives a beacon, because it is fire, recognizes with the common <sense>, seeing it move, that it is an alarm signal; sometimes, however, on the basis of images or thoughts in the soul, just as if seeing them, one calculates and deliberates about future things with reference to present things; and when one says that the pleasant or painful is there, in this case too one avoids or pursues, and this so with action in general. And what does not involve action, namely truth and falsity, is in the same genus as the good and the bad, though to be sure they differ as to whether they are so unqualifiedly or relative to someone. As for things spoken in abstraction, one thinks them just as if one were to think the snub: insofar as it is snub, it is not something separated, but insofar as it is concave, if one were to think it in actuality, one would think it without the flesh in which the concave is present. Thus mathematical objects are not separated <entities> which one <only> thinks as separated, whenever one thinks them. Generally, intellect in actuality is the things <it thinks>. Whether or not it is possible for it to think any of the separated entities, given that it is not itself separable from magnitude, must be investigated later.</p> <p>8. Now, by way of summarizing the things which have been said about the soul, let us say again that the soul is in a way all beings; for beings are either perceptible or thinkable, and knowledge is in a way knowable objects, and perception perceptible objects. Yet how this is so has to be explored. Knowledge and perception, then, are divided with reference to things, when in potentiality with reference to things in potentiality and when in actuality with reference to things in actuality. The soul's faculty of perception and its faculty of knowledge are these things in potentiality, namely the latter is the object of knowledge and the former the object of perception. It is necessary that they be either things themselves or their forms; clearly they are not the things themselves, for it is not the stone that is in the soul, but its form. Consequently, the soul is just like the hand: the hand is a tool of tools, and so too intellect is a form of forms and perception a form of perceptible objects. Since there is no separate thing apart from perceptible magnitudes, as it seems, the objects of thought are in the perceptible forms, both those that are spoken of in abstraction and those that are states and affections of perceptible objects. And because of this, one could not learn or understand anything without engaging in perception; and whenever one contemplates, one must at the same time contemplate some image, for images are just like percepts, except that they are without matter. But imagination is different</p>
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10 14	καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μὴθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ ζυνείη· ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμα τι θεωρεῖν· τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὡσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης, ἔστι δ' ἡ φαντασία ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως· συμπλοκὴ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ τᾶλλα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων.	kada aktualizira znanstveno znanje>, nužno je da istodobno motri neku predodžbu. Naime, predodžbe su poput osjetilnih utisaka, osim što su bez materije. A predočavanje je različito od tvrđenja i nijekanja, jer je istinito ili neistinito sveza misli. A po čemu se razlikuju primarne misli od predodžbi? Ili ni ostale misli nisu predodžbe, nego ih nema bez predodžaba.	from assertion and negation, since what is true or false is an interweaving of thoughts. However, how will the primary thoughts differ from images? In fact, not even the others are images, but do not occur without images.
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